We consider the problem of securing distributed storage systems (DSS) against an eavesdropper Eve that can observe any subset of nodes of bounded size. The goal is to construct a weakly secure DSS that leaks no meaningful information to Eve. More specifically, Eve should not be able to get any information about any individual data file or a small group of files. The key benefit of the weak security paradigm is that it incurs no loss in the storage capacity, which makes it practically appealing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed storage systems (DSS) have recently received significant research attention due to their important applications in data centers and cloud networks. To achieve reliability in DSS, some form of redundancy needs to be introduced using replication or erasure coding. Erasure coding is attractive in terms of storage efficiency, but it requires large amount of data to be downloaded during the repair of a failed node. To address this problem, Dimakis et al. [1] introduced a new class of codes, referred to as regenerating codes, which significantly reduce the amount of data downloaded during the repair process.
Specifically, Dimakis et al. [1] , [2] showed that there exists a trade-off between storage space per node and repair bandwidth for single node failure, and regenerating codes optimally achieve this trade-off. The codes on one extreme point of the optimal storage-repair bandwidth trade-off curve that minimize the repair bandwidth are referred to as Minimum Bandwidth Regenerating (MBR) codes; whereas, the codes on the other extreme point that minimize the amount of data stored at each node are referred to as Minimum Storage Regenerating (MSR) codes. Several explicit code constructions have been proposed for exact regenerating codes, wherein the repaired node is an exact replica of the failed node (see [3] and references therein). In this paper, we utilize product-matrix Swanand MBR codes [4] , since these codes can be constructed for the entire range of parameters and require small finite field size.
Another important challenge for a DSS is the security of the stored data. For instance, some of the storage nodes or links in a cloud network can be eavesdropped. Providing secrecy against eavesdropping is particularly challenging in DSS because of their dynamic nature, with nodes continually failing and being repaired. At any point of time, an eavesdropper Eve can observe any subset of nodes or links of bounded size.
DSS can be secured using either conventional cryptographic techniques or information-theoretic approaches. One major drawback of almost all the secret key based encryption techniques is that they require secret key management mechanisms, which incur significant computational and communication overhead. Information-theoretic model for securing regenerating codes was introduced by Pawar et al. [5] , [6] . Since then, a number of investigations have been carried out on characterizing outerbounds on secrecy capacity and the associated achievable schemes (see [7] , [8] , [9] ). All these results are focussed on the paradigm of information-theoretic perfect secrecy. Essentially, perfect secrecy requires that the eavesdropper gains absolutely no information about the stored data from its observations.
To be precise, suppose that a DSS is storing B s data files S = {S 1 , . . . , S Bs }, where each file can be considered as a symbol in a finite field F q . Let E denote the set of (encoded) symbols that Eve can observe. A DSS is said to be perfectly secure if the mutual information between the message symbols S and the eavesdropped symbols E is zero, i.e., I (S; E) = 0.
For many practical storage systems, this condition might be too strong. Moreover, coding schemes that provide perfect secrecy involve mixing data symbols with random keys to confuse the eavesdropper, which incurs loss in the storage capacity. Considering these drawbacks of the perfect secrecy notion, we focus on the notion of weak secrecy [10] . 1 The notion of weak secrecy requires that an eavesdropper gains no information about any individual data file. For example, let the number of files be B s = 4, and the size of the finite field be q = 7. Further, suppose that Eve observes the following two encoded
Then, Eve cannot get any information about any individual data file, when the files are uniformly random and independent 1 Note that the notion of weak secrecy that is introduced in [10] and considered throughout this paper, is different from the conventional notion of information-theoretic weak secrecy, which is defined for asymptotically large block-lengths. The weak secrecy notion considered in this paper is applicable to finite block-lengths as well. of each other.
Furthermore, weak secrecy requires that even if Eve can obtain some g files as a side information, she should not be able to decode for any other file. For instance, if Eve has a side-information of g = 1 file, she cannot decode for any other file by observing E. Notice that this condition is equivalent to saying that Eve cannot gain any information about a small group of files (of size g +1). Essentially, weakly secure coding schemes use data packets as keys, and thus, do not incur loss in storage capacity.
Despite of its practical benefits, there have been relatively very few attempts on employing weak secrecy for DSS. In [11] , Oliveira et al. presented a construction of weakly secure erasure codes for DSS without considering the regeneration aspects. Very recently, Dau et al. [12] have analyzed the weak secrecy properties of two families of regenerating codes: regular-graph codes [13] and product-matrix codes [4] .
In this paper, going a step ahead from [12] , we focus on designing outer codes to improve the weak secrecy properties of regenerating codes. To be specific, we present explicit construction of a coset coding based outer code to weakly secure product-matrix (PM) codes operating at MBR point (referred to as PM-MBR codes) [4] for the scenario wherein Eve can observe any single storage node. The proposed coding scheme has numerous advantages. First, it enhances the weak secrecy properties of the PM-MBR codes in terms of the amount of side-information g that Eve can have without being able to decode any new file. In particular, when the size of the stored data is large, the gain in g achieved by the proposed coding scheme is twofold. Second, the proposed outer codes leverage the elegant structure that is present in the PM codes, and thus, require small finite field size. Finally, the weaksecrecy capacity of the proposed coding scheme is nearly equal 2 to the non-secure storage capacity. These features make the proposed coding scheme attractive in practical settings.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Regenerating Codes
Suppose we need to store a set of B files S = {S 1 , . . . , S B }, where each file can be considered as a symbol from a finite field F q that is drawn uniformly and independently. A DSS consists of n storage nodes, with each node capable of storing α symbols. A regenerating code encodes the B files into nα coded files in such a way that it satisfies the following two properties. First, a data collector (DC) connecting to any k out of n nodes is able to reconstruct the entire set of files; this is referred to as the reconstruction property. Second, when a storage node fails, it is regenerated by adding a new node which downloads β symbols each from any d out of the remaining n − 1 nodes; this is referred to as the regeneration property. A regenerating code with these parameters is referred to as an (n, k, d, α, β) regenerating code.
Under these requirements, the outer bound on the capacity of an (n, k, d, α, β) regenerating code is given as [ 
(1)
For an (n, k, d, α, β = 1) MBR code, we have B = k−1 i=0 (d − i), and α = d (see [2] ). If the regenerated node is an exact replica of the failed node, then the repair model is said to be exact repair [13] . In this paper, we focus on a special class of exact MBR codes referred to as the product-matrix MBR codes [4] , which are described in Section II-D.
B. Eavesdropper Model
The most generalized eavesdropper model for a DSS, referred to as the (l 1 , l 2 )-eavesdropper model, is considered in [9] (see also [7] ). An (l 1 , l 2 )-eavesdropper, Eve, can access the data stored on any l 1 nodes, and the data downloaded during regeneration of any l 2 nodes.
Notice that at the MBR point, the number of downloaded symbols is equal to the number of stored symbols. Therefore, Eve cannot gain any additional information by observing the data downloaded during the regeneration, and thus, it is sufficient to simply consider the total number of nodes l := l 1 + l 2 that Eve has access to.
In this paper, we assume that Eve can access any single storage node. Thus, we have l = 1. We assume that Eve is passive, has unbounded computational power, and has the knowledge of the coding scheme being used.
C. Information-theoretic Secrecy
Suppose S = {S 1 , . . . , S Bs } denotes the set of B s data files where each file S i ∈ F q , and E denotes Eve's observations. A DSS is said to be perfectly secure if I (S; E) = 0. Under this requirement, Pawar et al. [5] characterized an upper bound on the secrecy capacity as:
Comparing (1) and (2), we can say that in a perfectly secure DSS, the l nodes that are compromised by the eavesdropper cannot effectively contain any useful information. Consequently, the perfect secrecy requirement results in a loss of storage capacity, i.e., B s < B.
Remark 1. Shah et al. [7] show that PM-MBR codes can be made perfectly secure against an (l 1 , l 2 ) eavesdropper by appropriately mixing random keys with the message symbols. The secure codes achieve the capacity outer bound given in (2) , and the loss of capacity incurred due to perfect secrecy requirement is B − B s = ld − l 2 . In this paper, we focus on a relaxed, yet practically appealing, notion of weak secrecy [10] . A DSS is said to be weakly
Furthermore, suppose Eve is able to obtain, as a side information, some g data files denoted as S G := {S i : i ∈ G} for some G ⊂ [B s ] such that |G| = g. Then, a DSS is said to be weakly secure against g guesses if we have [14] , it was shown that the above condition is equivalent to
(4) Essentially, this condition implies that in a scheme that is weakly secure against g guesses, it is not possible for Eve to obtain any information about any subset of g + 1 files from her observations. 3
D. Recap of Product-Matrix MBR Codes
Let us review the Product-Matrix framework based MBR Codes (PM-MBR Codes) proposed in [4] . The PM-MBR code is obtained by taking the product of an (n × d) encoding matrix Ψ and a (d×α) message matrix M that contains the B message symbols arranged in a particular fashion. Specifically, the encoding matrix Ψ and the message matrix M have the following structure.
data symbols in the upper triangular half; whereas, the other component matrix
The matrices Φ and ∆ are chosen in such a way that any k rows of Φ are linearly independent, and any d rows of Ψ are linearly independent. If Ψ is chosen to be a Vandermonde or a Cauchy matrix, these requirements are satisfied. Note that the field size q depends on the choice of the encoding matrix Ψ. For instance, if Ψ is a Vandermonde matrix, then field sixe of q ≥ n is both necessary and sufficient.
The α symbols stored on the i-th node are given by C i = ψ i M , where ψ i denotes the i-th row of Ψ. The regeneration and the reconstruction processes can be found in [4] .
Example: Consider an (n = 5, k = 3, d = 4, α = 4, β = 1) PM-MBR code. Then, from (1), we have B = 9. Let the files to be stored are given as X = {x 1 , · · · , x 9 }, where x i ∈ F q ∀i. Suppose the encoding matrix Ψ is a Cauchy matrix. Then, in parametric form, we have
where a i , b j ∈ F q such that a i = b j and a i + b j = 0 for all i, j. Note that, to satisfy these requirements, we need at least n + d = 9 distinct elements, and thus, we require q ≥ 9.
III. EXPLICIT CODE CONSTRUCTION FOR WEAK SECURITY
A. Summary of Main Results
We propose explicit construction of a coset coding based outer code to weakly secure PM-MBR code, when Eve can observe any single storage node, i.e., l = 1. The proposed scheme works for the entire range of parameters [n, k, d] that are feasible for PM-MBR codes. The weak secrecy capacity of the proposed scheme is B s = B − 2, where B is the capacity without any secrecy requirement. The proposed scheme is weakly secure against g ≤ d + k − 4 number of guesses.
B. Outer Code Based on Coset Coding
We propose to use an outer code to improve the weak secrecy level (i.e., the amount of side information that Eve can possess) of the PM-MBR codes. When outer code is used, the overall encoding consists of two steps. First, an outer code is used to encode the set of B s data files S = [S 1 · · · S Bs ] ∈ F Bs q into a codeword X = [X 1 · · · X B ] ∈ F B q . Next, the codeword X is encoded using the PM-MBR code (as an inner code) by populating the entries of matrix M (see (5) ) with the codeword symbols X. To obtain the data file S, a user would first decode X using the reconstruction process of the PM-MBR code, and then, decode the outer code to get S. Notice that the regeneration process of PM-MBR codes remains the same.
We design the outer code based on coset coding [15] . A coset code is constructed using a (B, B − B s ) linear code C over F q with parity-check matrix H ∈ F Bs×B q . Specifically, the data files S are encoded by selecting uniformly at random some X ∈ F B q such that S = HX. Therefore, the vector S can be considered as a syndrome specifying a coset of C, and the codeword X is a randomly chosen element of that coset. Notice that the decoding operation of a coset code consists of simply computing the syndrome S = HX.
To design the matrix H appropriately, we need to transform the weak secrecy condition (4) into a condition involving H. For this, we use the following result from [ 
where H G is a sub-matrix of H formed by choosing the rows indexed by the set G .
Then, using (4) and (7), we can observe that the weak secrecy would be satisfied by designing H and G such that
C. Outer Code Construction for PM-MBR Codes
As previously mentioned in Section II-B, we assume that Eve can observe any single storage node. Let e denote the index of the node that Eve can access. Eve observes α = d symbols stored on node e given by E = (ψ e M ) T , where ψ e is the e-th row of Ψ. To use condition (8) , we need to find a matrix G e such that E = G e X. This is carried out by a simple linear transformation that guarantees E = (ψ e M ) T = G e X.
To describe the transformation formally, assume without loss of generality, that the B outer-coded symbols X = {X 1 , . . . , X B } are filled in the message matrix M in a lexicographic order for 1 ≤ j ≤ d and 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Therefore, if M (i,j) denotes the (i, j)-th entry of matrix M , then we have M (1, 1) 
Under this setting, the symbols observed by Eve can be written as E = G e X, where (i, b)-th entry of the d×B matrix G e is given as
for 1 ≤ i ≤ d and 1 ≤ b ≤ B. Note that G e can be considered as a generator matrix of PM-MBR code for node e. To ensure weak security against g guesses, we need to design H such that for each node e ∈ [n], its generator matrix G e satisfies (8) .
Example: For the previous example of (n = 6, k = 4, d = 5, α = 5, β = 1) PM-MBR code, if Eve observes the first node then we can write G 1 as (9) (at the top of the page).
Remark 2. Observe that matrix G e for each node e ∈ [n] is sparse. In particular, G e for each node e ∈ [n] contains at least one row vector with Hamming weight k. Thus, PM-MBR codes are not secure against g ≥ k − 1 guesses, when Eve can observe one storage node. This shows the necessity to employ an outer code to improve the level of weak secrecy. Remark 3. It is possible to use a random matrix as H, however it would require very large field size. This is because the condition (8) must be satisfied for all sub-matrices of H, the number of which are exponentially large. Moreover, for each sub-matrix H G , we must ensure (8) for each node e ∈ [n], since Eve can observe any storage node. Therefore, we explicitly construct H that requires small field size.
Our aim is to jointly design a PM-MBR code and a coset code such that (8) is satisfied. Notice that while designing a PM-MBR code, the only degree of freedom that we have is in choosing the encoding matrix Ψ such that the conditions specified in Section II-D are satisfied.
The main idea of our solution is to construct H such that it has the same structure as that of the generator matrix G e of a node for the PM-MBR code. The same structure of G e and H would enable us to ensure the condition (8) .
Since G e X = (ψ e M ) T , the values of the non-zero entries in G e are specified by ψ e and their locations depend on the indices of the elements of M . Further, the locations of nonzero entries in G e are the same for all nodes e ∈ [n]. To formally specify this structure present in G e , we introduce the notion of type. We say that a length-B row vector h (i) is of type i if the indices of its non-zero coefficients are the same as that of i-th row of G e ; the values of the non-zero coefficients can be different. We call the corresponding set of indices of non-zero coefficients as the index set of type i, denoted as I (i). Observe that, essentially, the type of a vector specifies the locations of the non-zero coefficients of the vector. Further, the total number of types is equal to the number of rows of G e , which is d.
Example: Considering our running example of (5,3,4,4,1) PM-MBR code, a vector of type 4 has the form h (4) = 0 0 0 γ 0 0 γ 2 0 γ 3 for some γ ∈ F q . The corresponding index set of type 4 is I (4) = {4, 7, 9}, which corresponds to the indices of elements of fourth column of M (see (6)).
We construct H such that each row of H belongs to one of the d types. Let θ i denote the number of row vectors of type i, 1 ≤ i ≤ d, that are present in H. Define θ := [θ 1 · · · θ d ], which we call as the type cardinality vector. For each θ i > 0, let H i denote the θ i × B sub-matrix of H that is composed of all the row vectors of type i.
Once the type of a row vector is fixed, it is sufficient to give a set of values of non-zero coefficients to fully specify the row vector. For example, the values of non-zero coefficients of all the vectors in G e are specified by the row vector ψ e . In a similar manner, we represent the non-zero coefficients of all the row vectors in H using a matrixΨ. Specifically, a d × d matrixΨ is defined in such a way that the j-th row ofΨ specifies the non-zero coefficient values of the j-th vector of type i that is present in H for i, j ∈ [d]. We call the matrix Ψ as the coefficient matrix. Observe that the type cardinality vector θ along with the coefficient matrixΨ are sufficient to specify the parity-check matrix H.
In the following, we describe an explicit construction of the encoding matrix Ψ and the parity check matrix H (in terms of θ andΨ). Construction 1. First, choose the type cardinality vector θ as follows.
Note that max 1≤i≤d θ i = d − 1.
Next, choose an n × d encoding matrix Ψ and a d × d coefficient matrixΨ in such a way that any square sub-matrix ofΨ := Ψ Ψ is non-singular.
Finally, usingΨ and θ, construct H as follows. For each θ i , 2 ≤ i ≤ d, the θ i × B sub-matrix H i of H is given as Note that the requirement onΨ that any of its square submatrices should be non-singular, can be ensured, for example, by choosingΨ as a Cauchy matrix. Another construction of a matrix that satisfies this requirement can be found in [17] . For both these constructions it is necessary and sufficient to have q ≥ n + 2d.
There are a couple of points about this requirement onΨ that are worth mentioning. First, note that this requirement onΨ implies that any square sub-matrix of Ψ should also be non-singular. This is a stronger requirement, which guarantees the two requirements on Ψ that are mentioned in Section II-D. Second, choosing Ψ as a Vandermonde matrix, which is good enough to meet the requirements of PM-MBR codes, is not sufficient, since a Vandermonde matrix defined over finite field can contain singular square sub-matrices (see [17] , also [12] ).
Example: For the running example, construction 1 yields θ = {0, 3, 3, 1}. Let the 5 × 4 encoding matrix Ψ be a Cauchy matrix. We chooseΨ such thatΨ = Ψ Ψ is also a Cauchy matrix. Note that this requires q ≥ 13. Then, the resulting parity-check matrix H is given in (13) (on the next page).
D. Analysis
First, we characterize the file size that can be stored in a weakly secure sense by using the proposed scheme. Theorem 1. When an outer coset code based on the paritycheck matrix H given in Construction 1 is used along with a PM-MBR code, the weakly secure storage capacity is B s = B − 2.
Proof: See appendix A. Next, we compute the level of weak secrecy that can be attained using the proposed scheme. Remark 4. In [12] , it is shown that, when Eve observes l nodes, the PM-MBR codes using Cauchy matrix as their encoding matrix are weakly secure against k − l − 1 guesses. Thus, for l = 1, PM-MBR codes are secure against k − 2 guesses. Our proposed encoding enhances the level of security to d + k − 4 guesses, which is an improvement of d − 2. Notice that, for any regenerating code, d ≥ k. Thus, for large k, the enhancement in the number of guesses g is almost twofold.
APPENDIX A
Here, we present an outline of the proof. For details, the reader is referred to [18] . Notice that the set of files that are securely stored, can be considered as the syndrome of the coset code as S = HX. Thus, the weak-secrecy capacity is the dimension of matrix H. First, we show that, if H is designed following construction 1, it contains B − 2 rows. Next, we show that H is full-rank to prove the result. Now, notice that the total number of rows in H is equal to
where (a) follows from (1) and from the fact that at MBR point α = d (we assume that β = 1).
To prove that H is full-rank, a B × B matrix H is constructed from H as follows. Append to H, a type k row vector with non-zero coefficients specified by the d-th row ofΨ, and a type 1 row vector with non-zero coefficients specified by the first row ofΨ. Then, H is showed to be non-singular, by showing that it is possible to successively decode the system of linear equations Z = H Y . In successive decoding, we first decode the variables in Y indexed by I (k) using d rows of type k that are present in H . Then, we consider the rows of type k − 1 and solve for the variables in Y indexed by I (k) \ I (k − 1). An iterative algorithm for the successive decoding along with the proof of its correctness is given in [18] . Notice that proving the non-singularity of H , in turn, implies that its sub-matrix H is full-rank.
Note that successively decoding for the variables of a particular type is equivalent to performing Gaussian elimination on the corresponding rows of that type. Thus, in essence, the procedure for successive decoding specifies the order in which Gaussian elimination can be performed in H .
Example: Consider H given in (13) , which follows from construction 1. To form H , first append a row vector of type 3 with non-zero coefficients specified byΨ 4 . Then, append a row vector of type 1 with non-zero coefficients specified bŷ Ψ 1 . To prove that H is full-rank, observe that we can decode for variables indexed by I (3) = {2, 5, 6, 7} using the four rows of type 3. Notice that I (3) ∩ I (2) = 6. Then, using the three rows of type 2 and already decoded variable at index 6, solve for variables indexed by I 
the property that any square sub-matrix of the Cauchy matrix Ψ is non-singular.
APPENDIX B Again, we present an outline of the proof; for details the reader is referred to [18] . Essentially, we need to prove that condition (8) always holds for the proposed coding scheme as long as |G | ≤ d + k − 3. For notational convenience, let
Since H is full-rank as shown in Theorem 1, its sub-matrix H G will be full rank for any G ⊆ [B s ]. Further, it has been shown in [7] that for PM-MBR codes each storage node stores α linearly independent symbols, thus, it follows that G e is full-rank. Therefore, to prove (8), we need to prove that the matrix T is full-rank. As in the proof of Theorem 1, we show that, if |G | ≤ d+k−3, it is always possible to append B − |G | − α rows of appropriate types to T in such a way that the resulting B × B matrix T is non-singular. Particularly, we present a simple iterative algorithm which, for any given H G and node index e ∈ [n], appends row vectors of appropriate types to T to form the matrix T . Then, it is shown that it is possible to successively decode the system of linear equations Z = T Y (see [18] ). Thus, if |G | ≤ d + k − 3, the matrix T can always be completed into a non-singular B × B matrix, which in turn proves that T is full-rank. Example: For our running example, consider one possible matrix T as shown in (15) (at the top of the page). To prove that T is full-rank, we show that it is possible to append appropriate rows to T in such a way that successive decoding is possible. First, append two rows of type 3 and decode for the variables indexed by I (3) = {3, 6, 8, 9}. Then, using the two rows of type 4, decode for the variables indexed by I (4) \ ((I (3) ∩ I (4))) = {4, 7}. Next, using the two rows of type 2, decode for the variables indexed by I (2) \ ((I (2) ∩ I (3)) ∪ (I (2) ∩ I (4))) = {2, 5}. Finally, using a row of type 1, decode for the variable indexed by I (1)\((I (1)∩I (3))∪(I (1)∩I (4))∪(I (1)∩I (2))) = {1}. The non-zero coefficients of the appended rows are specified by the appropriate rows ofΨ, and the successive decoding utilizes the property that any square sub-matrix of the Cauchy matrixΨ is non-singular.
